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“No Dogs or Chinese Allowed”: Globalization and China
L AW R E N C E  C. R E A R D O N
D E PA RT M E N T  O F  P O L I T I C A L  S C I E N C E
An Evolving Process of Cooperation
Globalization is a process in which barriers between
people—both natural and man-made—are dismantled
to allow a freer of exchange of ideas, capital, goods, and
services.1 This ongoing process of change began when
individuals ﬁrst communicated with one another to se-
cure food and shelter. Such behavior resulted in local-
ized communities of cooperation, of which less nomadic
groups organized into villages, towns, and eventually
nation-states.
Yet according to Thomas Hobbes, one of the most
inﬂuential British political philosophers of the 17TH cen-
tury, these cooperation communities did not live in har-
monious bliss, but in a brutish, anarchic environment.2
Individuals cooperated within small communities, as
members could ensure cooperation. Yet as groups grew
in size, individuals had a greater ability to pursue their
self-interest, which was not necessarily for the beneﬁt of
the community.3 To prevent such defections, cooperative
communities entered into a social contract, in which
they surrender their individual rights to all-powerful
leaders such as kings and emperors (i.e., hegemons),
who ensured that the greatest good could be achieved.
Embodying such absolutist ideals was Hobbes’ contem-
porary, the French monarch Louis XIV, who reportedly
stated, “L’état c’est moi” [I am the state]. With the devel-
opment of the modern democratic capitalist state, hege-
monic rulers were replaced by elected leaders, who had
to adhere to the rule of law.4
These laws also created artiﬁcial barriers between in-
dividuals living in separate cooperative communities.5
Coexisting in a brutish anarchic environment, coopera-
tive communities erected protectionist barriers to insu-
late themselves from external threats.6 Over time, these
cooperative communities established separate lan-
guages, customs, and other forms of preferential ex-
change that further separated the community member
from “the other.” Natural barriers of exchange also ex-
isted, such as the physical distance between communi-
ties. Large-scale exchange of goods and services thus oc-
curred only within the global trading empires, such as
imperial Rome, China, Spain, France, and Great Britain,
whose hegemon could enforce behavioral norms within
the cooperation community. Yet lacking a single global
hegemon, global economic warfare could break out be-
tween cooperative communities at any time, such as the
regional trade wars of the 1930s.7
During the post-World War II period, the large trad-
ing empires relinquished formal control of their impe-
rial colonial holdings. Led by the United States, demo-
cratic and non-democratic capitalist countries
embarked upon a new stage globalization that gradually
increased the scale of the cooperation communities that
established global rules and norms of behavior—or in-
ternational regimes.8 Within the global trade regime
embodied by the World Trade Organization (WTO),
these capitalist economies dissolved many protectionist
barriers to international exchange and sacriﬁced many
sovereign economic rights.9 Multinational corporations
(MNCs) and international ﬁnancial institutions thus
could link together the developed and developing
economies; aided by technological, ﬁnancial, and trans-
portation innovations, these cooperative communities




Emerging from the colonial exploitation of the past,
economies in the developing world were far more sensi-
tive to the detrimental effects of the anarchic interna-
tional environment dominated by the capitalist coop-
eration communities. They sought to achieve
comprehensive economic growth by adopting two in-
dustrial development strategies—inwardly- and out-
wardly-oriented development.10
Until the early 1980s, China adopted inwardly-
oriented strategies of development, which regarded the
international economy as a dangerous adversary, whose
inﬂuences on the domestic economic growth needed to
be controlled or eliminated. Beginning with its relation-
ship with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, China imple-
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mented a comprehensive strategy of importing manu-
facturing technology for intermediate goods (petro-
chemicals, steel), producer durables (machinery) and
consumer durables (automobiles, televisions, etc.) in
order to reduce imports from abroad. This strategy was
called import substitution.11 Combined with vigorous
regulation of foreign investment and extensive subsidies
for domestic industry, China protected state-owned
enterprises’ (SOEs’) monopoly of the domestic market.
While making export activities unproﬁtable, the over-
valued exchange rate enabled China to import industrial
production technology and equipment for targeted
industrial sectors. In essence, China depended on the
international marketplace in the short-term in order to
achieve autonomy or self-reliance in the long-term.
During the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, the
Chinese leadership implemented a more autarchic (i.e.,
self-sufﬁcient) strategy of development, which man-
dated the complete isolation of China from the global
economy except in a few instances.12
By the early 1980s, the Chinese leadership had
learned the limitations of inwardly-oriented develop-
ment, just as leaders in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
had during the previous decades.13 China thus adopted
an outwardly-oriented development strategy, which is
based on theories of comparative advantage proposed
by the English political economist, David Ricardo.14
Theoretically, developing economies enjoy comparative
advantage in labor and/or land, and thus expand
production of labor-intensive commodities for the
domestic and export markets. Lacking capital and entre-
preneurial ability, developing economies increase
imports of capital intensive products and progressively
lift many protectionist barriers to foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI). Eventually, they adopt a more equitable
pricing system for production inputs, revalue their cur-
rencies, and eliminate certain protectionist quotas and
non-tariff barriers.15 Unlike the pre-1979 period,
Chinese leaders considered the global economy as a
“partner in development,” which could provide an
invaluable source of export revenue, technology innova-
tion, and capital ﬁnancing.
During the subsequent two decades of outwardly-
oriented development, China became the premier desti-
nation for FDI and enjoyed an unprecedented exchange
of technical and managerial expertise. As a result of
these and other economic reforms, China enjoyed an
average annual real GDP growth rate between 1979
and 2004 of 9.3 percent; by the end of 2004, China had
attracted $563 billion of FDI, 43 percent of which came
from Hong Kong, 8.5 percent from the United States,
and 8.3 percent from Japan.16 Having learned like Japan
and the other East Asian economies to harness foreign
capital and technology to develop its economic
competitiveness, China has now entered the next stage
of globalization by establishing Chinese MNCs—the
“Go Global” strategy.
Restricting Cooperation Communities
The United States and the European Union are greatly
concerned about the impact of Chinese globalization
schemes. Americans continued to import foreign goods
at record levels in 2004, resulting in a $617 billion overall
trade deﬁcit, of which there was a $162 billion bilateral
trade deﬁcit with China.17 China produces two-thirds of
the world’s television sets, watches, DVDs, and other do-
mestic electronic goods. During the ﬁrst four months of
2005, Chinese garment exports to the US rose between
70-1,500 percent.18 China is now the largest consumer of
copper, tin, aluminum, lead, zinc, platinum, steel, and
iron ore, resulting in tremendous cost increases around
the globe; it is claimed that the current $60 per barrel
costs of petroleum is due to China’s burgeoning auto-
mobile industry. Chinese companies have recently
submitted solicited and unsolicited bids for major US
companies. China’s largest computer hardware manufac-
turer, Lenovo, acquired IBM’s ThinkPad division; TLC
bought the RCA television division from the French
manufacturer, Thomson. Seeking to expand its share of
the international marketplace for household appliances
(i.e., white goods), the Chinese MNC Haier unsuccess-
fully bid $1.28 billion to acquire the US manufacturer,
the Maytag Corporation. In 2005, China’s third largest
energy company, the China National Offshore Oil Cor-
poration (CNOOC), announced plans to acquire the
California-based petroleum and natural gas corpora-
tion, Unocal, for $18.5 billion.19
Although China is now a member of the WTO, the US
reaction has been increasingly negative and protection-
ist. The Congress and the Administration successfully
demanded that China revalue its currency, even though
most economists agree that such reevaluation will have
little impact on the current account deﬁcit.20 Despite the
traditional support for free trade, the US is currently
engaged in talks with Chinese trade ofﬁcials concerning
the US proposal to impose quotas and restrictions on
seven categories of Chinese textile and garment imports;
the EU has already restricted Chinese textile imports.
While the US government approved Lenovo’s acquisi-
tion of IBM’s laptop computer division, the US House of
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Representatives voted 398 to 15 that CNOOC’s acquisi-
tion of Unocal’s energy resources threatened US na-
tional security.21
As Tom Freidman has argued, globalization is a fact of
life that the US should embrace and not use as an excuse
to erect protectionist barriers.22 The US should be tout-
ing China’s transformation from a moribund, Marxist-
Leninist state to a globalizing, capitalist economy as a
potential model for other developing nations. Simulta-
neously, the US should leverage China’s desires to “Go
Global” to encourage China’s compliance with interna-
tional trade laws and norms of behavior. As Chinese
MNCs enter the US marketplace, the US should insist
that US-based MNCs be accorded similar treatment
within the Chinese marketplace. This would address
looming problems with Chinese restrictions on foreign-
invested enterprises’ access to the Chinese market, the
lax enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR),
and other such problems.23 Finally, the US must remem-
ber that US protectionists railed against Japan, Inc. in
the 1980s. Yet, the US allowed Japanese MNCs such as
Toyota, Honda, and Nissan to establish US-based design
and manufacturing facilities. Located throughout the
US, these facilities are producing high-paying jobs for
US workers and top-quality automobiles for the US
market. In these days of high oil prices, the competition
from these truly multinational corporations is convinc-
ing Detroit to switch from producing gas-guzzling SUVs
to developing hybrid cars that are highly fuel efﬁcient
and produce low emissions.
Restricting cooperation communities will result in a
world of exclusivity akin to colonial Shanghai of the
1930s, in which a public park sign reputedly warned,
“No dogs or Chinese allowed!”24
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